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NOTES

Judicial Interference: Redefining
the Role of the Judiciary within
the Context of U.S. and E.U.
Merger Clearance Coordination
ABSTRACT

In December 2003, Sony and Bertelsmann AG (BMG)
sought approval from the Federal Trade Commission and
European Commission to effectuate a joint venture between the
two companies. Remarkably, almost two years after both
antitrust authorities had cleared the Sony-BMG joint venture,
the Court of First Instance annulled the European
Commission's decision to approve the transaction.
This
groundbreaking decision by the Court of First Instance has the
potential to undermine coordination efforts between antitrust
authorities in the United States and the European Union, as
well as to frustrate the predictability and efficiency that
businesses need in merger regulation. Using the regulatory
review of the Sony-BMG transaction as a startingpoint, this
Note examines judicial review of merger clearance decisions in
the United States and the European Union. The Note then
suggests that judicial standards of review should recognize
successful multinational coordination as a reason to defer to
antitrust authority decisions
and
require
increased
transparencyto facilitate such review.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2003, Sony and Bertelsmann AG (BMG) announced
a proposed joint venture.' In what could be considered a success story
in bilateral coordination, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
European Commission (Commission) worked closely together during
their investigations and came to a uniform result: both granted
clearance to Sony and Bertelsmann in July of 2004.2 However, upon
petition by Sony-BMG competitors in the European Union, the Court
of First Instance (CFI) annulled the Commission decision two years
after it was handed down. 3 The annulment was the first of its kind;
the CFI had never annulled a Commission merger clearance

1.
Press Release, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation Agree on Music
Merger (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http:I/www.sony.net/SonyInfo/IR/news/2003/
qfhh7cOOOOOOavs4-att/bertels.pdf.
2.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004 Declaring a
Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA
36 (EC) [hereinafter Commission Decision
Agreement, 2005 O.J. (L 62) 30,
2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004]; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Closes
Investigation of Joint Venture Between Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of
America (July 28, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/sonybmg.htm;
Sony, BMG Merger Receives Green Light, ABC NEWS (Austl.), July 29, 2004, available
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/07/29/1164358.
3.
Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the Decision Authorising
the Creation of Sony BMG (July 13, 2006), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/
communiques/cp06/aff/cpO6006Oen.pdf.
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decision. 4 Through the groundbreaking exercise of its annulment
authority in this merger matter, the CFI struck down regulatory
approval of a merger almost two years after the deal's completion, a
scenario that is undesirable from the point of view of the regulated
entities. 5 The events unfolding in the Sony-BMG case beg one
question: is there a way, to prevent judicial review in Europe from
frustrating attempts at coordination between antitrust authorities
across the Atlantic? If so, is there a way to reconcile the two systems
to further legitimize the goal of coordination?
This Note answers both questions in the affirmative.
It
compares judicial review of merger clearance in the United States
and Europe, using the Sony-BMG joint venture as an instructive
example of how the allowance of judicial review after coordination
between European and U.S. antitrust authorities has the potential to
undermine such attempts at transatlantic coordination. Part II of
this Note discusses the background of the Sony-BMG joint venture,
the non-reviewability doctrine applicable to FTC decisions in the
United States, judicial review of Commission decisions in the
European Union (E.U.), and standing issues relevant to both. Part
III discuses the importance of transnational coordination, explains
the divergence between the European model of reviewability and the
U.S. model of non-reviewability, and reveals problems of deference on
the European side and transparency on the U.S. side that frustrate
coordination attempts. Part IV offers a solution to move towards
sensible and workable coordination of competition law in the U.S. and
E.U. To give credence to these values, this Note posits that both the
U.S. and European judicial standards of review should reflect the fact
that successful coordination on a multinational level is itself reason to
defer to antitrust authority decisions. Specifically:
(1) both the Commission 'and the FTC should be required to
make any relevant information about coordination on a
transnational level public in its decisions;
(2) the 1998 cooperative agreement currently in place between
the U.S. and the E.U. should be reformulated to provide for
required cooperation in merger review;
(3) the CFI's standard of review should recognize coordinative
efforts as a reason to defer to Commission decisions; and
(4) U.S. federal courts reviewing private antitrust challenges to
mergers should defer to FTC clearance decisions that stem
from transnational reconciliations.

4.
EU & Competition: A Round-Up of Major European Cases: Sony/BMG,
Meca-Median, FENIN, and Volkswagen, SIMMONS & SIMMONS, July 1, 2006,
www.simmons-simmons.com/docs/66aroundupofmajor.pdf.
5.
Keith Regan, EU Says Sony-Bertelsmann Merger Approved in Error, ECOMMERCE TIMES, July 13, 2006, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/51752.html.
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Many would argue that non-reviewability of FTC decisions
already confers supreme deference on the FTC, making disclosure of
the reasons for clearance decisions unnecessary. However, because
private litigants in the U.S. have the potential of upsetting efforts at
coordination by challenging FTC clearance decisions indirectly, it is
necessary to require the publication of reasons for clearance decisions
on the U.S. side.

II.BACKGROUND
A. The Sony-BMG Transaction
In December 2003, Sony, a global music recording and
publishing company, and Bertelsmann AG, an international media
company, proposed a joint venture between the two companies to be
operated under the name "Sony BMG. ''6 At that time, both Sony and
Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Bertelsmann, were active participants in the music recording
The joint venture between the two companies would
industry.
discover artists, develop them, and engage in the marketing and sale
7
of recorded music.
On July 28, 2004, the FTC closed its investigation of the joint8
venture, allowing Sony and Bertelsmann to proceed with their plan.
While closing an investigation is not necessarily conclusive in today's
world of retrospective enforcement actions against consummated
mergers, the negative inference to be drawn from the close of the
FTC's investigation is that the agency found no actionable violations
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act. 9 The FTC,
which is under no obligation to explain its decision not to challenge
the joint venture, declined to do so.10
During its investigation, the FTC worked closely with the
Commission of the European Communities, which was conducting a
similar investigation of Sony-BMG with respect to the European
This cooperation between the FTC and the
common market. 1

6.
7.
8.

Press Release, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation, supra note 1.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supra note 2, 1.
Press Release, FTC Closes Investigation, supra note 2; Sony, BMG Merger

Receives Green Light, supra note 2.
Press Release, FTC Closes Investigation, supra note 2. For two examples of
9.
recent retrospective enforcement actions, see In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare,
2005 FTC LEXIS 146, 146 (2005), and In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., N.V., 2004 FTC
LEXIS 250, 250 (2004).
15 U.S.C.S. § 46 (LexisNexis 2006).
10.
Press Release, Commission Decides Not to Oppose Recorded Music JV
11.
Between Sony and Bertelsmann (July 20, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/959.
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Commission stemmed from a 1991 agreement to coordinate in
competition law enforcement. 12 Under the agreement, U.S. and
European competition authorities notify each other of cases of
common interest, exchange information, cooperate on related cases,
and to the extent legally possible, take account of the other's
regulatory interests. 13 A subsequent 1998 agreement that currently
does not apply to mergers (due to investigatory timetables) expanded
this notion of comity in competition law, gave further guidelines for
comity requests, and raised the presumption of bilateral
cooperation.14
On May 24, 2004, the Commission provisionally decided that the
joint venture "would reinforce a collective dominant position on the
market for recorded music" and initiated a second-phase
investigation. 15
Two months later, the Commission's Antitrust
Advisory Committee approved a draft opinion granting clearance of
the Sony-BMG joint venture.16 On July 19, 2004, the Commission
concluded that the joint venture "does not create or strengthen a
single or collective dominant position in the national markets for
recorded music, licenses for online music, or distribution of online
music" so as to impede competition in the common market. 17 Finding
the joint venture to be compatible with the common market, the
Commission, like the FTC, granted clearance.' 8
Sony and
Bertelsmann consummated their joint venture on August 5, 2004.19
On December 3, 2004, Impala, an international association of
independent
music
production
companies,
challenged
the
Commission's decision in the CFI.20 After expedited proceedings, the

12.
Agreement on Application of Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C.,
Nov. 23, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Cooperative
Agreement]. The agreement was signed by Sir Leon Brittan for the E.C., and William
Barr (then U.S. Attorney-General) and Janet Steiger (then FTC chair) for the U.S.
This particular agreement was invalidated on August 9, 1994, by the European Court
of Justice because the European Commission did not have the power to conclude the
antitrust agreement. However, a subsequent 1998 agreement, discussed infra note 14,
largely furthered the 1991 agreement's goals.
13.
Id. arts. II-LV.
14.
Agreement Concerning the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the
Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-E.C., art. 3, June 4, 1998, 1998 O.J.
(L173) 28 [hereinafter 1998 Cooperative Agreement]; Charles W. Smitherman III, The
Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons from the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 769, 810-12 (2004).
15.
Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the Decision, supra note
3.
16.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supranote 2, 4.
17.
Id. 36.
18.
Id.
19.
Press Release, Sony Music Entertainment and BMG Unite to Create Sony
BMG Music Entertainment (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://blog.sonymusic.com/
sonybmg/archives/007012.html.
20.
Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the Decision, supra note
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CFI annulled the Commission's earlier decision on July 13, 2006.21
In a "scathing judgment," 22 the CFI found that the Commission's
decision was based upon "inadequate reasoning," a "manifest error of
assessment," and insufficient data. 23 The Commission was ordered to
reevaluate the joint venture in light of the CFI's opinion. In March of
2007, the Commission issued a Press Release stating that it had
"decided to open an in-depth investigation into the merger of the
global recorded music businesses" of the two parties. 24 In October
2007, after performing what Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes
called "one of the most thorough analyses of complex information ever
undertaken by the Commission in a merger procedure," the
25
Commission confirmed approval of the joint venture.
B. The Law of Agency Inaction in the United States
1.

Reviewability Doctrine in the United States: The FTC as an
Untouchable Authority

In the United States, the FTC is not subject to review when it
exercises prosecutorial discretion. While APA § 701 establishes a
presumption for judicial review unless it has been withheld (1) by
statute or (2) when "agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law," 26 the Supreme Court has subsequently given amnesty to
agency decisions not to take action. 27 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court
found that when an agency does not take enforcement action, that
decision is committed to agency discretion by law. 28 Consequently,
agency inaction falls under the second exception to § 701.29 The
Court offered three reasons to support its conclusion: (1) the agency's
expertise makes it better situated to understand the complicated
factors that comprise a decision not to take action; (2) agency inaction
does not give rise to the same threats to individual liberty and

21.
Id.
22.
EU & Competition, supra note 4.
23.
Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006
E.C.R. 11-02289, 542.
24.
Press Release, Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation into
Sony-BMG Recorded Music Joint-Venture (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://europa.eu
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/272.
25.
Press Release, Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval of Recorded Music
Joint Venture Between Sony and Bertelsmann After Re-assessment Subsequent to
Court Decision (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/07/1437%20%20&format=PDF&aged=O&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en.
26.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2007).
27.
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An
ArbitrarinessApproach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667 (2004).
28.
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
29.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 846; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
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property that agency enforcement actions do; and (3) separation of
powers requires the Judiciary to heed the Executive Branch's
discretion to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. 3 0° In
short, Heckler "insulate[s] from judicial review an entire class of
administrative decisions-namely, agency inaction."'' a
While
Congress could presumably abrogate this judicial rule, it has not done
so with respect to the FTC's regulation of mergers.3 2 For this reason,
agencies in "the United States . . .generally refrain[] from disclosing
the basis for clearance decisions (unlike the European Commission),
and rarely elaborate[] upon ... decisions to settle. 33 Thus, while the
FTC must apply for a preliminary injunction with a district court in
order to block a merger, the agency is not obligated to justify its
actions or to answer challenges from affected parties when clearing a
merger.34
However, one could argue that private rights of action to pursue
antitrust claims ameliorate the possible ill-effects of Heckler v.
Chaney when the FTC fails to act. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
provides for pre-emptive measures to curtail corporate business
combinations that may "substantially lessen competition" or create a
monopoly.3 5 Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act allow private
litigants to obtain relief from a Section 7 violation. 36 Section 4
awards treble damages to those injured in business or property as a
result of an antitrust violation and Section 16 provides for injunctive
relief against threatened loss or damage stemming from a violation of
the antitrust laws.3 7 The private rights of action allow proper
plaintiffs to obtain review of a merger clearance indirectly.3 8 A party
seeking Section 16 injunctive relief from a merger previously cleared
by the FTC is not alleging a direct harm from agency inaction.
Rather, when the agency has failed to take action with respect to a
merger, a subsequent challenge by a proper plaintiff is grounded in

30.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
31.
Bressman, supra note 27, at 1667. In the context of an antitrust challenge,
however, third-party standing to challenge mergers, even those cleared by the FTC,
has been made possible by statute. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
32.
See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 41-58 (LexisNexis 2006) (failing to provide review under
the Clayton Act or the FTC Act).
33.
Edward T. Swaine, Against PrincipledAntitrust, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 959, 981
(2003).
34.
15 U.S.C.S. §§ 21, 25; Swaine, supra note 33, at 981.
35.
15 U.S.C.S. § 18.
36.
Id. §§ 15, 26.
37.
Id.
38.
For Section 4 cases, the Supreme Court has stated that an antitrust
plaintiff must prove that am injury resulted from the violation, that the injury was
causally related to the violation, and that the injury was one of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flowed from that which made defendant's acts
unlawful. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 535-46 (1977).
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harms stemming from the merger or the anticompetitive conduct
39
itself.
Who is a proper plaintiff in such situations? Any competitor or
consumer capable of showing a threat of antitrust injury may bring
suit.40 However, competitors have found that standard difficult to
meet. The Supreme Court answered this question in Cargill v.
Monfort of Colorado.41 In Cargill, the country's fifth-largest beef
packer sought to enjoin the acquisition of the country's third-largest
beef packer by the country's second-largest beef packer. 42 The Court
denied standing to the competitors because a plaintiff only alleging a
"loss or damage due merely to increased competition," without more,
is not injured under the meaning of the antitrust laws. 43 Cargill
effectively fences out competitors from private antitrust claims, but
leaves an opening for consumers to pursue such claims. In sum,
while the FTC is not directly accountable for its merger clearance
decisions, affected or aggrieved parties (primarily consumers) may
seek relief through private action.
2.

The Sony-BMG Investigation at the FTC

Little is known about the reasoning behind the FTC's decision to
close its investigation of the Sony-BMG joint venture and, in fact, the
FTC is not required to make its reasons public. 44 With respect to the
close of the Sony-BMG investigation, three documents are available

39.
Id. at 552.
40.
See, e.g., Cargill v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986) (noting,
in an antitrust context, that a competitor has the ability to recover).
41.
Id. Seventeen years before, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 129-31 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, the Supreme Court found
that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under Section 16 need only show a significant
threat of injury from the violation. Ten years after Zenith, the Supreme Court
advocated a multi-factor test to determine standing in a Section 4 antitrust case: the
causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to plaintiff and
whether that harm was intended, the directness or indirectness of the injury and
whether the damages are speculative, the potential for duplicative or windfall
recoveries, the existence of more direct victims of the alleged violation, and the nature
of the injury. Assoc. Gen., 459 U.S. at 535-46. Another five years later, the D.C.
Circuit decided Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Chrysler, an automobile manufacturer, brought suit under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, alleging injuries stemming from an impending joint venture between
General Motors and Toyota to manufacture a car. Id. at 1184. The FTC had reviewed
the proposed joint venture and authorized the final plan with several modifications.
Id. With respect to the plaintiffs standing, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 16
"extends to 'threatened as well as actual injuries and is not limited to injuries to a
party's business or property.'" Id. at 1188 (quoting Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse
Shopping Ctr. Assoc., 472 F. Supp. 665, 671 (N.D.N.Y. 1978)).
42.
Cargill,479 U.S. at 106.
43.
Id. at 122.
44.
Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51
BUFFALO L. REV. 937, 953-54 (2003).
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to the public: a press release stating that the FTC had decided not to
take enforcement action, the closing letters sent by the FTC to the
parties, and a statement by one of the Commissioners regarding the
joint venture. 45 Champions of the administrative process may
presume that the FTC followed the Merger Guidelines in analyzing
the joint venture: that the FTC defined the relevant product and
geographic markets, calculated market shares, and measured
46
possible efficiencies that could result from the joint venture.
However, in contrast to the extensive disclosures that the
Commission must make in clearing a merger in Europe (as shown in
Subpart (C)(3)(i) below), the FTC is under no obligation to explain its
reasoning. 47 Consequently, little is known about how important
international considerations were to the FTC's decision to clear the
Sony-BMG joint venture.
C. Reviewability Doctrine in the European Communities
Reviewability and standing doctrine are different in the
European Communities for two reasons. First, the Commission must
create a record of reasons for review regardless of whether the
Commission blocks or clears a merger. 48 Second, a Commission
decision to clear a merger is reviewable and subject to challenge by
proper plaintiffs. 4 9 Particularly in the realm of competition law, the
CFI tends to scrutinize the Commission's reasons for validity and
thoroughness.5 0 The CFI reviews both determinations of law and
fact, although in theory, determinations on factual findings are
limited to whether the Commission's findings are justified on the
record. 51 As a result of these two differences in European competition
law, it is much easier for third-parties "direct[ly] and individually
concerned" by the Commission's failure to challenge a merger to
obtain review from the CFI.

Press Release, FTC Closes Investigation, supra note 2.
45.
46.
See generally 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41, 552
(U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n 1992), rev. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. § 13104
(Apr. 8, 1997).
47.
Swaine, supra note 33, at 981.
48.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 253, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 135, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulen/treaties/dat
12002E/pdfI12002EEN.pdf [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty 2002].
Josh Manuel Cort6s Martin, At the European Constitutional Crossroads:
49.
Easing the Conditions for Standing of Individuals Seeking Judicial Review of
Community Acts, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 129-30 (2003).
Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585; Case T-310/01,
50.
Schneider Electric v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071; Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v.
Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381; Jurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European
Administrative Procedure,68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 100 (2004).
Smitherman, supranote 14, at 788.
51.
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Duty to Give Reasons

As the executive arm and "principal administrative organ" of the
European Communities, the Commission must ensure "the proper
functioning and development of the common market" and work to
achieve the European Communities' objectives as expressed in
Treaties. 52 The Commission is empowered by Council Regulation to
institute legal proceedings to determine whether a violation of
competition law exists and conduct investigations either on its own
initiative, or upon application by a Member State or a natural or legal
person claiming a legitimate interest in a matter. 53 The European
Commission is under a continual obligation to explain both its
enforcement and clearance decisions. If the Commission moves into a
Phase II investigation of a transaction, it is required to set forth and
make publicly available a written statement of objections, detailing
54
the competitive concerns leading to a more rigorous investigation.
Article 253 EC also requires the European Commission to "disclose in
a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning [that it] followed" when
making its decision after such an investigation. 55 This rule applies
regardless of the Commission's ultimate determination to clear or
block a joint venture or merger. 5 6 An inadequate Commission

52.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 230, 1992 O.J. (C 224)
1, 59 [hereinafter EC Treaty 1992]; see generally Virpi Tiili & Jan Vanhamme, The
"Power of Appraisal" (Pouvoir D'Appreciation) of the Commission of the European
Communities Vis-ei-vis the Powers of Judicial Review of the Communities' Court of
Justice and Court of First Instance, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 885 (1999) (quoting EC
Treaty 1992, supra note 52, art. 155).
53.
Smitherman, supra note 14, at 786-88.
54.
Keith R. Fisher, Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for
the WTO?, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 327, 336 (2006). It is of note that, while the
statement of objections is merely a preparatory document, the findings set out in the
final decision of the Commission must be compatible with the findings of fact made in
the statement of objections, unless the Commission establishes that its previous
findings were incorrect. EU & Competition, supra note 4. In Sony-BMG, the CFI
commented on Sony-BMG's lack of further market investigation following hearings
with the parties, as well as its subsequent provision of data by the parties, which was
the basis on which the Commission changed its views regarding the joint venture. Id.
Some may claim that the CFI's annulment was justified, because without finding the
former objections in error, the Commission could not justifiably take a different
position in its final decision from that taken in its statement of objections. Id.
However, in defense of the Commission's actions, it should be noted that the
Commission have been following a prior decision in which the ECJ proposed that in
cases of doubt, the Commission should always err on the side of clearing a merger.
Matteo F. Bay, Javier Ruiz Calzado & Andreas Weitbrecht, Judicial Review in EU
Merger Control: Recent Developments, EUR. ANTITRUST REV. 27, 28 (2007), available at
http://lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/publ6721.pdf.
55.
EC Treaty 1992, supra note 52, art. 253.
56.
Id.
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explanation results in annulment by the CFI, and subsequent
57
reexamination by the Commission.
2.

Reviewability

All acts adopted by the E.U. institutions are subject to judicial
review. 58 The CFI "shall" ensure that "the law is observed" by the
Commission by examining the content of the Commission's measure,
the nature of the reasons given, and the parties' interest in obtaining
an explanation. 59
The EC Treaty allows the CFI to review
Commission opinions for "lack of jurisdiction, procedural error, error
of law and misuse of power. '60 Since ratification of the Treaty,
however, CFI precedent has expanded its powers of review by adding
three more grounds: error of fact, error of appreciation, and absence
61
of reasoning.
Although European Courts have "traditionally granted broad
discretionary powers to the administration, especially [in competition
law cases] when complex economic analysis is involved," the CFI
expressed a new willingness to scrutinize Commission reasoning with
respect to competition law questions in 2002.62 That year, the CFI
annulled the Commission's merger prohibition (as opposed to
clearance) decisions in Airtours,63 Schneider Electric,64 and Tetra
Laval.65 The CFI found problematic the "legal definitions, treatment
of the evidence, and the factual and economic analysis of that
evidence.

' 66

It is this more exacting standard that has survived to

the present: the CFI looks at the evidence anew, weighs it for
soundness, and confirms the logical link between the Commission's
conclusions and its factual findings. 67
If the CFI annuls a
68
Commission decision, the Commission must reexamine the merger.

57.
EC Treaty 1992, supra note 52, art. 21; Mark Clough, The Role of Judicial
Review in Merger Control, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 729, 730 (2004); Tiili &
Vanhamme, supra note 52, at 891.
58.
Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What
the EU Should Learn From American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 1, 31 (20042005).
59.
Schwarze, supra note 50, at 93; Tiili & Vanhamme, supra note 52, at 886.
60.
Clough, supra note 57, at 730.
61.
Id.
62.
Schwarze, supra note 50, at 100. That year alone, the CFI annulled the
Commission's decisions to prohibit mergers in Airtours, Schneider Electric, and Tetra
Laval. Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. H-2585; Case T-310/01,
Schneider Electric v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1H-4071; Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v.
Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. H-4381.
63.
Case T-342/99, 2002 E.C.R. IH-2585.
64.
Case T-310/01, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071.
65.
Case T-80/02, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381.
66.
Clough, supra note 57, at 730.
67.
Id. at 751-52.
68.
Id.
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Even more significantly, in a recent groundbreaking CFI decision, the
CFI ordered the Commission to compensate Schneider Electric for
losses sustained when the Commission illegally prohibited its
transaction in 2001.69 One must wonder if there is any room for
deference in a system where scrutiny is so commonplace and the
stakes for illegally prohibiting a transaction are so high.
Who may challenge a Commission decision? Article 230(4) of the
EC Treaty allows "[a]ny natural or legal person" to challenge "a
decision addressed to that person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to
'70
another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
Section 4 thus permits a third-party to challenge a Commission
decision any time a decision is of a "direct and individual concern" to
him or her. 71 The ECJ has since narrowed the types of parties that
are proper in its Plaumann v. Commission decision.7 2 In Plaumann,
the ECJ interpreted Article 230 to fence out any plaintiffs not
"peculiarly" affected by a Commission decision or "differentiated from
all other potential plaintiffs. '73 With little exception, the CFI and the
ECJ have applied the Plaumann doctrine to restrict citizens seeking
74
annulment of Commission decisions.
While citizens are less likely to successfully challenge the
Commission, in competition cases the CFI allows industry
participants (in both a horizontal and vertical relationship with the
parties at issue) to challenge Commission decisions. 75 A competitor
"is distinguished individually because his competitive position in the
market has been affected. '7 6 For example, in Demo-Studio Schmidt v.
Commission,7 7 a retailer entitled by law to report anticompetitive

Renee Cordes, European Commission Suffers Historical Setback in Court
69.
Loss, DAILY DEAL, Jul. 11, 2007, at 1.
70.
EC Treaty 1992, supra note 52, art. 230.
71.
Id.
72.
Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Comm'n, 1963 E.C.R. 95.
73.
Id. at 107. In Plaumann,a German importer of clemetines challenged the
Commission's refusal to allow Germany to charge lower import duties on clementines.
However, the importer did not meet the requirements of Article 230(4) because he was
not "peculiarly]" affected by the decision or "differentiated from all other [potential
plaintiffs]." Id.
74.
Recently, the CFI deviated from the Plaumann doctrine in Jego-Quere et
Cie SA v. Commission when it found "no compelling reason" to require that a
prospective plaintiff have a concern that is differentiated from all others. See Danny
Nicol, Rights of Judicial Protection before the EC Courts, 7 J. C.L. 147, 148 (2002)
(citing Case T-177/01, Jego-Quere et Cie SA v. Comm'n, 2002 C.M.L.R. 44). However,
shortly thereafter, the ECJ reaffirmed the applicability of the Plaumann standing
requirements to prospective plaintiffs in its Uni6n de Pequeios Agricultores v. Council
of the European Union decision. See id. (citing Case T-173/98, Uni6n de Pequefios
Agricultores v. EU Council, 1999 E.C.R. 1i-3357).
75.
See, e.g., Case 75/84, Metro v. Comm'n, 1986 E.C.R. 3021.
76.
Martin, supra note 49, at 130.
77.
Case 210/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3045.
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conduct under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (governing
selective distribution contracts) filed a complaint against a
distributor. 78 When the Commission refused to cite the distributor
for the allegedly violative conduct, Demo brought suit to vindicate its
79
indirect interest in seeing the laws enforced against the distributor.
The CFI allowed the suit and found that the distributor's alleged
violations of Articles 85 and 86 in refusing to grant the retailer a
dealership were "capable of affecting [the retailer's] legitimate
80
interests."
Two years later, in Metro v. Commission,8 the CFI conferred
standing on Metro, a distributor harmed by a Commission decision to
exempt an electronics manufacturer from Article 85 of the EC Treaty,
and allowed the manufacturer to enter into a selective distribution
contract.8 2 Metro had properly submitted objections during the
Commission's deliberations, was recognized by the Commission as
having a legitimate interest, and thus was undeniably "directly and
decision.8 3
Commission's
the
with
concerned"
individually
Commission decisions are thus at a minimum subject to challenge by
competitors, and Impala's challenge of the Commission's clearance of
the Sony-BMG joint venture was welcome due to the organization's
direct and individual competitive concerns.
3.

The Sony-BMG Investigation in the European Community

i.

The European Commission's Decision

Under the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC
Treaty), the Commission must block concentrations (mergers or
acquisitions) that are "incompatible" with the common market.8 4 To
be incompatible, a merger or acquisition must "create[] or
strengthen[] a dominant position" so as to significantly impede
effective competition. 5 Consequently, the Commission's inquiry in
86
the Sony-BMG case began with the question of market power.
First, the Commission defined the relevant product markets (recorded
music, wholesale licensing of online music, retail for distribution of

78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Case 75/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3021.
82.
Id.
1.
83.
Id.
20-23.
84.
Council Regulation
139/2004, Control of Concentrations
Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 7.
85.
Id.
86.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supra note 2,

Between
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online music, and music publishing) and the relevant geographic
87
market (national in scope).
The Commission next examined whether the joint venture would
strengthen an already-existing collective dominant position held by
the five major players in the music recording market in the member
nations. 88 To discern whether a coordinated price policy existed
between the players, the Commission considered the following
factors: (1) the historical average net prices of the top-selling 100
records in member nations; (2) whether published prices to dealers
facilitated price coordination; and (3) the effect of discount systems on
prices and market transparency. 89 While several of these factors
indicated that the market was susceptible to price coordination, the
Commission did not find sufficient evidence to prove that such
coordination was actually occurring. 90
Moreover, other factors-the homogeneity of the product at
issue, the transparency of pricing of albums in the market, and
whether market players had ever attempted to discipline market
"mavericks"-also weighed against existing collective dominance. 9 1
The products were heterogeneous on an album level; the need to
monitor pricing on an album-by-album basis reduced market
transparency; and insufficient evidence existed to show prior
attempts to discipline mavericks in the markets. 92 Based on its
consideration of each of these factors, the Commission concluded that
93
a collective dominant position did not exist between the five players.
For all the same reasons, the Commission found that the joint
venture would not create a position of collective dominance in the
94
market.
The Commission also examined the possibility of a single
dominance in the recorded music markets in smaller member nations
resulting from the vertical integration of Bertelsmann media
interests with the joint venture's recorded music interests. 95 The

87.
Id. 7 6-11. Despite the fact that the Commission examined all four
relevant markets, this Note will only discuss the recorded music market because the
CFI limited its review to that market. Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers &
Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-02289,
543. While the Commission believed
that the recorded music and music publishing product markets might merit further
delineation, it did not believe that further investigation was warranted, given its
overall decision that the joint venture would not create or strengthen an existing
collective or single dominance in any markets. Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19
July 2004, supra note 2, 7 7, 11.
88.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supra note 2, 13.
89.
Id.
17-19, 24-29.
90.
Id. 20.
91.
Id. 7 20-25.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. 26.
94.

Id.

95.

Id. 77 28-29.

27.
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Commission found such dominance unlikely because BMG's market
shares would not hit an undetermined threshold. The Commission
also found no evidence "that it could be a profitable strategy" for
9 6
Bertelsmann to block competitors from use of its media outlets.
Thus, the transaction raised no red flags for the Commission and
challenging the joint venture -was not necessary.
ii.

The Decision of the Court of First Instance

Impala's challenge prompted the CFI to annul the Commission's
decision.9 7 First, the CFI disagreed with the Commission's position
that discount systems would reduce the transparency of the market
to the point of preventing the existence of a collective dominant
position, and demanded more data and reasons from the Commission
for its decision. 98 The CFI also found that evidence of efforts to
discipline other market participants is not necessary, because the
mere existence of such disciplining mechanisms is sufficient to find
that a collective dominant position exists. 99
Finally, the CFI
"criticised the Commission for having carried out an extremely
cursory examination and for having presented in the decision only a
few superficial and formal observations" with respect to the possible
creation of a collective dominant position. 100 In short, the CFI
annulled the Commission's decision for "inadequate reasoning," a
"manifest error of assessment," and insufficient data. 10 1

III.

THE IMPORT OF TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION, RATIONALE FOR
DIVERGENT MODELS, AND RESULTING PROBLEMS OF DEFERENCE AND
TRANSPARENCY

In the current global market, cooperation across the Atlantic is
necessary and desirable. As barriers to trade decrease, each nation's
restraints on competition take on new significance. Entry into
markets must be reevaluated.
Regulatory overlap imposes
substantial transaction costs on parties seeking to merge. 10 2 Positive
externalities from a transaction in one economy often create negative
externalities for another.'0 3 It is for this reason that European and
U.S. antitrust authorities currently work closely on many pre-merger

96.
97.

Id.
Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the Decision, supra note

98.

Id.

99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006

3.

E.C.R. 11-02289, 1 543.

20071

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

1559

reviews and have entered into agreements that reach far beyond
predecessor agreements on regulatory cooperation. 10 4 For example,
"the 1991 Agreement reflects transatlantic consensus that 'sound and
effective enforcement of competition law is a matter of importance to
the efficient operation of both markets. 1 0 5 Coordination ensures that
domestic regulators will account for the impact of their own
regulations on foreign consumers and markets, as well as differences
10 6
in regulatory strategies and consumer preferences.
Coordination is itself a struggle: the European and U.S. systems
are said to strive for the related but sometimes conflicting goals of
maximizing business rivalry on the European side, and maximizing
consumer welfare on the U.S. side. This divergence may lead to
contrary positions in particular cases. 10 7 Notwithstanding that
potential hurdle, in the case of the Sony-BMG joint venture, U.S. and
European regulators came to a consistent solution.' 0 8
The
availability of judicial review in Europe has thrown a proverbial
wrench into that cooperation, however. The CFI's decision in SonyBMG has caused "considerable concern" for industry participants in
Europe because it undermines the ability of those participants to
depend on clearance decisions that have been made after extended
investigation. 10 9 By extension, such concern is likely shared by any
large corporation operating globally that may seek clearance from the
Commission (and the FTC) in the future. Part III of this Note will
attempt to explain the divergence between the European and U.S.

102.
Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 627, 629-30 (2001); Smitherman, supra note 14, at 774-75. Indeed, in this case,
Sony and Bertelsmann could not be certain that the Commission would approve the
joint venture until almost four years after the two companies initially sought approval.
Press Release, Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval, supra note 25.
103.
Smitherman, supra note 14, at 777.
104.
Id. at 822-23.
105.
Id. at 810-11 (quoting 1991 Cooperative Agreement, supra note 12, pmbl).
106.
Id. at 822.
107.
The United States determined that a merged General Electric and
Honeywell would have given its competitors an incentive to improve their products by
delivering better products at cheaper prices. In contrast, the European Commission
believed that any efficiencies and lower prices produced by the General ElectricHoneywell transaction would force competitors out of the market, or reduce their
market shares to an uncompetitive point. See generally Eric S. Hochstadt, Note, The
Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 289-90
(2002) (noting that U.S. regulators conditionally accepted the merger, while EC
regulators prohibited it).
108.
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supra note 2,
36;
Press Release, FTC Closes Investigation, supra note 2; Sony, BMG Merger Receives
Green Light, supra note 2; see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global
Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 482 (2000) (stating that "inconsistent
substantive outcomes of investigations by competition authorities in different nations"
may result in "unnecessary burdens" on international competition).
109.
Bay et al., supra note 54, at 28.
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models in the area of clearance, and discuss the problems inherent in
both.
A. Why Some Form of Judicial Review of Commission Clearance
DecisionsIs Necessary in the European Union
1.

The U.S. and the E.U. Seek to Vindicate Related but at Times
Conflicting Substantive Goals that Necessitate Judicial Review
in the E.U. but not in the U.S.

Differences in competition policy in the U.S. and the E.U. give a
partial explanation for the European allowance of judicial review and
competitor standing to challenge Commission decisions.
While
coordination between EC and U.S. competition authorities since the
1980's has eased the burden on regulated entities and led to more
comprehensive and consistent policymaking in an increasingly global
market, 110 the U.S. and EC follow "considerably different approaches
to competition policy."1 1' While the U.S. pursues an antitrust policy
to maximize consumer surplus by placing a high value on efficiency,
the E.U. "often appears to promote business rivalry more than the
maximization of consumer surplus."'1 12
Under this view of
competition law, certain market structures involving greater
concentrations are inherently suspicious because they create
opportunities for the exercise of market power. 113 Thus, the EC will
often block mergers or require divestitures to guarantee that less
efficient rivals will not be driven from the market. 114 In the struggle
not merely to maintain, but also to create a competitive common
market, merger clearance that will promote oligopolistic market
115
structures are taboo.
The CFI's decision in Sony-BMG reflected this concern. The CFI
worried that allowing the joint venture might create "a situation"
that would enable market oligopolists to engage in tacit price

110.
John J. Parisi, InternationalRegulation of Mergers: More Convergence, Less
Conflict, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509, 515-16 (2005).
111.
Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Relaity in the Merger
Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
423, 424 (2005).
112.
Id.
113.
Id.; see Aditi Bagchi, The PoliticalEconomy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 4, 6 (2005) (recognizing that European regulators of competition focus on
the effect of mergers on competitors to a.greater degree than their counterparts in the
United States, and that European regulators would "normally disapprove" a merger
that would significantly enhance the market position of a dominant firm even in the
face of increased efficiency).
114.
Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 111, at 458-59.
115.
Fisher, supranote 48, at 344.
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coordination. 1 16
The court indicated that the historically close
alignment of industry net prices could be the result of "tacit price
coordination" rather than effective competition, and that the
transparency of the market would make average prices predictable
and deviation from pricing apparent to all major market
participants. 1 17 The paramount concern expressed in each of these
points is that price coordination would frustrate the ultimate goal of
promoting business rivalry.
Why should this difference in European antitrust policy lead to
different doctrines of standing and judicial review than exist in the
United States? When a competitor seeks to challenge a clearance
decision in Europe, it is more likely that the competitor is vindicating
a policy that is allied with E.U. competition policy. 1 18 Competitors
fearing that they will be driven out of the market will find a
sympathetic ear in any system that values business rivalry as the
European one does. 119 Consequently, allowing Impala-a group of
smaller independent music producers that would likely be at the
margins of the market-to challenge the joint venture may best
further the E.U. interest in maximizing business rivalry. 1 20 Just as
the CFI vindicated European competition interests by regulating the
anticompetitive effects of selective distribution contracts in Demo and
Metro, the E.U.'s interests are furthered by granting Impala standing
12 1
to sue Sony-BMG.
The role of competitors in other aspects of the E.U. merger
clearance process demonstrates this key difference between the
European and U.S. systems. The European model not only affords
competitors an opportunity to appeal to the CFI, but also a platform
to voice concerns and a significant role in investigations. 1 22 For
example, during EC investigations, third party competitors may
participate in an otherwise closed oral hearing. 12 3 Parties to a
transaction are obligated to respond to the concerns of competitors as
124
much as they are to respond to the Commission's concerns.

116.
Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006
E.C.R. 11-02289, 522.
117.
Id.
70, 253, 528.
118.
Bagchi, supra note 113; Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 111.
119.
Bagchi, supra note 113, at 4-5.
120.
Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the Decision, supra note
3.
121.
Case 75/84, Metro v. Comm'n, 1986 E.C.R. 3021; Case 210/81, Demo-Studio
Schmidt v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3045, 1.
122.
See James S. Venit & William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and
ProceduralDissonance in Merger Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE

FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 79, 95 (Simon J. Everett et al. eds., 2000) (noting
that complainants play a major role in merger clearances in the EU due to procedures
that improve transparency and increase access for interested parties).
123.
Id.
Id.
124.
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Competitor-participants also have access to relevant investigatory
documents, such as the EC's Statement of Objections and responsive
12 6
documents. 125 Hearings are otherwise closed to the general public.
While industry input is also important to FTC investigations,
competitors do not play such a central role in U.S. merger clearance
decisions.
Instead, the U.S., system's commitment to consumer
welfare necessitates the exclusion of competitors, who would likely
have a perverse incentive to bring suit. 12 7 As Cargill recognizes,
competitors seeking the injunction of a merger fear that they will lose
profits when the merged entity "lower[s] its prices to a level at or only
slightly above its costs. ' 128
However, in the U.S. system, such
"vigorous competition" could only serve to increase the quality and
decrease the price of the good sold. 12 9 That a smaller group such as
Impala might be marginalized by the Sony-BMG joint venture is of
less concern to the FTC than the probability that the merger would be
efficient.1 30 If Sony-BMG raised its prices post-merger instead, the
U.S. system would expect new entrants and consumers incentivized
13
with the promise of treble damages to fill the void. '
Furthermore, while a merger's future effect on industry
competitors is best discerned from industry input, efficiencies to be
generated by a merger are more readily discernible by agency experts
with less input from third parties. 3 2 As the Merger Guidelines
suggest, the majority of "the information relating to efficiencies is

125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Gifford & Kudrie, supra note 111, at 458-59, 462; E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 1 (2003); see Cargill
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) ("To hold that the antitrust laws
protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in
effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market
share. The antitrust laws require no such perverse result ... .
128.
Cargill,479 U.S. at 114.
129.
Id. at 116.
130.
See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 127 ("Current antitrust analysis
suggests that courts interpret the law so as to promote the maximization of consumer
welfare.").
131.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 15(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws . . . shall recover threefold damages .... "). This does not mean, however, that
competitors are left without recourse. As Cargill notes, in a predatory pricing scheme,
competitors would have standing to sue. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118 (stating that
predatory pricing is "a practice 'inimical to the purposes of [the antitrust] laws"'
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977))).
132.
See generally Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not Competitors," Nor
Canards: Ways of Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 597, 625-26
(2002) (noting that while there are "obvious risks" to heeding the claims of third parties
in investigations, the participation of third-party competitors may have its advantages,
including providing supplemental information consumers may lack, and acting as a foil
to the merging parties who may also have merging interests and influences).
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uniquely in the possession of the merging firms."' 3 3 Logically, these
firms, rather than third-parties, must present and substantiate their
efficiencies claims for the agency; allowing third-party access or input
in this process might result in the disclosure of competitively
By definition, integration involves
sensitive information.1 3 4
information that would be of great utility to competitors, such as
information relating to restructuring or shifts in production.' 3 5 In
sum, the U.S. and the EC have at times divergent default rules of
competition that may lead to the need for competitor participation in
one model, but not in the other.136
2.

Heckler's Reasoning May Be Less Appropriate As Applied to the
Commission
The European model does not fit neatly into the reasoning given

by the Supreme Court for non-reviewability of non-enforcement
decisions in Heckler. This might be an alternative explanation for the
resulting differences in reviewability between the U.S. and E.U.
According to the Supreme Court, judicial review is unavailable for
FTC merger-clearance decisions for three reasons.13 7 First, the Court
found that the agency's expertise makes it better situated to make
judgment calls on enforcement.1 3 8 Second, the Court found that
agency inaction does not give rise to the same concerns of individual
liberty and property that agency enforcement actions do.' 3 9 Finally,
the Court concluded that the Judiciary need not interfere with the
Executive Branch's discretion to enforce laws. 140 This Note will

133.
134.
135.

Id.; see 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 46, § 4.
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 46, § 4.
See id.

The Agency has found that certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be
cognizable and substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable
the merging firms to reduce the marginal cost of production, are more likely to
be susceptible to verification, merger-specific, and substantial, and are less
likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output. Other efficiencies,
such as those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial
but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of
anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those relating to
procurement, management, or capital cost are less likely to be merger-specific
or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.
136.
Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 111, at 423-24. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that judicial review is unavailable for the decision of the Food
and Drug Administration not to exercise its enforcement authority over drugs used in a
lethal injection).
137.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
138.
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 832.
139.
Id.
140.
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examine whether the first and the third of these reasons could justify
141
non-reviewability or a rule of nondisclosure at the Commission.
First, it is worth exploring whether Heckler's expertise argument
is less appropriate in the European context. The Commission's
unique obligation to give reasons even when it declines to enforce a
treaty provision against a party may be justified by the fact that the
142
Commission is a more generalist body than its U.S. counterpart.
The twenty-seven members of the Commission are each in charge of
one area of the Commission's activity, as opposed to the U.S. model
143
containing a multi-member Commission for each area of expertise.
Moreover, while the E.U. may establish agencies to "take individual
decisions in specific areas" where the "tasks to be carried out require
particular .

.

. expertise," it may not delegate tasks involving areas

such as competition law because the E.U. Treaty has conferred a
144
direct power of decision on the Commission.
This theory would explain why the CFI has been reluctant to
defer to the Commission since 2002, the year it annulled three
Commission decisions in the area of merger control. 145 In those three
decisions, the CFI challenged the Commission's economic analysis
despite the complexity of the subject matter involved. 146 The CFI's
decisions were remarkable given the fact that "usually, an issue's
high
complexity
results
in
significant
administrative
discretion

.

.

.

and

reduced

judicial

review."'1 47

The

CFI's

thoroughness did not wane over the four years separating those three
cases from Sony-BMG. In its Sony-BMG decision, the CFI went
beyond simply asking for more data or additional reasons, concluding
that, contrary to the Commission's clearance decision, "the [Sony-

141.
As Professor Bressman notes, "[flew have found [the Supreme Court's
second argument that agency inaction is noncoercive] persuasive." Bressman, supra
note 27, at 1694. This Supreme Court argument flies in the face of the reality
discussed by Justice Marshall in Heckler: that the creation of the administrative state
was prompted by "the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as
devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as coercive
governmental action." 470 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., concurring). Surely when the
FTC decides to clear a merger, the rights of competitors as well as consumers may be
affected by the prosecutorial discretion exercised.
142.
Delegation to a more specialized body is also less likely in Europe because
the Commission is thought by some to be reluctant to delegate its existing powers to
more specialized agencies. Geradin, supra note 58, at 11.
143.
Jason M. Sullivan, Note, European Union Antitrust Enforcement: A Distinct
Prosecution or a More Principled Approach?, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
457, 476-77 (2005).
144.
Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 24, COM (2001) 428
final (July 25, 2001) available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/
com2001_0428en01.pdf.
145.
Schwarze, supra note 50, at 99.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
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BMG] concentration raises serious problems.' 148 In contrast to the
CFrs high level of scrutiny over Commission decisions, the FTC is
given jurisdiction over a limited and highly technical subject matter,
enjoy the highest degree of deference-no
and its clearance decisions
149
explanation is necessary.
If the Commission is more of a generalist institution than the
FTC, judicial review serves as a check to test the soundness of
Commission competition decisions that represent one portion of a
spectrum of areas over which the Commission exercises authority.
The explanation for the duty to give reasons in Article 253 reinforces
this claim. 150 According to Article 253, the reasons requirement
provides a metric for the reviewing court to "exercise its supervisory
jurisdiction."' 15 1 In clear contrast with the European system, the job
of supervising the FTC is left to the Executive Branch, and deference
152
is appropriate due to agency expertise.
However, the idea that the Commission may somehow have less
expertise than the FTC is a difficult pill to swallow. In fact, several
problems with this argument exist, making Heckler's first point, if
sound, just as applicable to the Commission as it is to the FTC.
Competition law is a large part of the Commission's concern, and the
impetus for the formation of the European Union was unification and
strengthening of a common market, of which competition law is an
Moreover, Neelie Kroes, the Commissioner of
integral part.
in
the E.U., oversees a Directorate General for
Competition
Competition that is charged with administering and enforcing E.U.
In fact, the Sony-BMG decision was made
competition policy. 153
after the appointment of the first Chief Competition Economist for
the Directorate, who is charged with ensuring that Commission
decisions are based on sound economic reasoning. 154 Finally, allowing
judicial review does not solve the problem of a lack of expertise: in
fact, the opposite may be true. 155 Consequently, of all European
Union institutions, the Commission (and the Directorate General)
appears to be the locus of expertise in competition matters, and the

Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006
148.
E.C.R. 11-02289; 528.
Geradin, supra note 58, at 24.
149.
Consolidated EC Treaty 2002, supra note 48.
150.
Id.; Tiili & Vanhamme, supra note 52, at 891.
151.
152. The FTC is an Independent Agency. 15 U.S.C.S. § 41 (LexisNexis 2006).
Nevertheless, Commissioners may be removed by the President "for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. Consequently, it may be said that the
FTC is supervised by the Executive Branch.
153.
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 996 (2000).

154.
EU & Competition,supra note 4.
See Swaine, supra note 33, at 986 (noting that too much judicial review
155.
may rob the law of its expertise).
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appointment and removal mechanisms in place for Commissioners
156
may make them just as insulated as executive actors at the FTC.

Second, Heckler's separation of powers argument may be less

In the U.S., executive branch

applicable in the European Union.

actors are thought to answer to other politically accountable officials

or to the President, thus obviating the need for judicial
interference. 15 7
However, the European model seeks to avoid
majoritarian pressures on Commissioners, which may create a need
Commissioners are proposed by national
for judicial review.' 5 8
governments and approved by the European Parliament to serve five-

year terms, rather than being directly elected by citizens. 159 Actions
taken by the Commission are monitored by committees to prevent
Commissioners

from

acting

in

the

interests

of

member

state

governments rather than the Commission as a whole. 160 Because it is
undesirable for Commissioners to do the will of both the public and

the governments in their home nations, judicial review and a duty to
may be particularly
thoroughly explain clearance decisions
necessary.

161

Furthermore,
European context

there

may be

a

more

pressing

need

in

the

for both judicial second-guessing and reasoned

explanation for clearance because the Commission gets only one

opportunity to diagnose the possible anticompetitive effects of a
merger.

16 2

Unlike U.S. enforcement

of antitrust laws, which can

occur after a merger's anticompetitive effects are apparent, the
16 3
Commission cannot intervene after a merger's consummation.

This reality alone may incentivize greater scrutiny during an initial
investigation, lengthier investigations in Europe than in the United
States, risk-averse decision-making with respect to whether a

156.
See The European Commission at Work-Basic Facts, http://ec.europa.eul
atworklbasicfacts/indexen.htm#comm (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
157.
See Bressman, supra note 27, at 1659 (discussing both the "accountability
theory," which "seeks to subject agency decisionmaking to the control of politically
accountable officials" and the "presidential control model" in which an "agency's failure
to act should be subject to the scrutiny of the President" as a figure "more majoritarian
than even Congress").
158.
See generally George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation Between the
European Commission and the U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933,
938-39 (1996) (discussing the role of the European Commission in regulation).
159.
The EU at a Glance-Europe in 12 Lessons-Lesson 4: How does the EU
work?, http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson-4/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2007).
160.
Bermann, supra note 158, at 941, 946-47 (discussing the structure of the
European Commission, including the network of committees supporting its work).
161.
See id. at 938 (emphasizing that Commission members are bound to "act in
the Community interest ...without instructions ... from the member State[s]").
162.
Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the
European Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 355-56 (2002).
163.
Id.
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business combination creates a dominant position, and a need for
judicial review regardless of whether a merger is cleared or
blocked. 164 In contrast, judicial interference may be less necessary in
the U.S. context because the FTC can always revisit a prior decision,
165
even after a merger has been consummated.
Even if judicial review of Commission decisions is prudent, the
problem of judicial review's interference with coordination still exists.
If cooperation is truly sought by the U.S. and Europe, the
Commission's coordination efforts with other national antitrust
authorities such as the FTC, pursuant to multinational agreements,
should not go wholly ignored by the CFI (as it did in Sony-BMG). On
the contrary, such coordination should lend support to the soundness
of Commission decisions. In sum, although a wholesale adoption of
U.S. non-reviewability is not workable in the E.U. A middle ground,
in which greater deference is given to the Commission in an
acknowledgment of its coordination efforts with other national
antitrust authorities, is more appropriate.
B. Problems Undermining the Optimizationof CoordinationEfforts
Between the E. U. and the U.S.
1.

The CFI Does Not Consider or Give Deference To Commission
Coordination Efforts

As shown above, for substantive and prudential reasons, it is
necessary to have judicial review and competitor standing in the
European model. Reviewability and standing doctrine are more
effective at vindicating European competition law values (such as
promoting business rivalry, checking the executive body, and
preventing mistakes) in a process where the E.U. institutions have
only one opportunity to reach the optimal result. Nevertheless,
allowing judicial review of Commission decisions still has the
potential to derail transnational coordination efforts. As one scholar
has noted, "[T]he Courts must not redo the Commission's work, but
must nevertheless do something, so they solely check for manifest
mistakes in the Commission's assessments, thereby cutting the
separation of powers knot nicely through the middle."'1 66 To achieve
this balance, coordination must be promoted to a greater position of
16 7
importance in the E.U. scheme.
Coordination in competition cases has become much more
difficult in the wake of recent developments that foreshadow more

164.

Id.

165.
Id.
Tiili & Vanhamme, supra note 52, at 898 (emphasis omitted).
166.
Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006
167.
E.C.R. H-02289, 543.
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rigorous review of Commission decisions. First, since ratification of
the EC Treaty, the CFI has expanded its own powers of review. 168 In
addition to the four grounds listed in the Treaty, 169 the CFI may now
review for error of fact, error of appreciation, and absence of
reasoning. 170 Second, while significant discretion has traditionally
been afforded the Commission in competition cases, the Airtours,
Schneider Electric, and Tetra Laval cases demonstrate that the CFI is
171
willing to "rigorous[ly] review" Commission competition decisions.
Certainly the CFI's Sony-BMG
decision reflects
this
rigorousness. In the more than five hundred paragraphs detailing its
decision, the CFI seemed to question the Commission's inferences at
every discretionary turn. When the Commission found that the
market was opaque enough to discourage price coordination, the CFI
disagreed. 172
Whereas the Commission found that market
disciplining mechanisms would not be used, the CFI found that the
173
existence of such mechanisms was enough to send up a red flag.
Consequently, it appears that the CFI has taken a step away from
deference to the Commission. The CFI's less deferential stance,
coupled with the fact that the Commission is not required to disclose
information about its efforts at coordination with any other national
antitrust authorities, create a system in which efforts at coordination
are swept under the rug and not considered. 174 Moreover, the system
currently in place allows the judiciary to make policy decisionsdecisions that the Commission alone has the authority to make and
that undermine bilateral coordination efforts. Requiring additional
disclosures about collaboration, and forcing those disclosures to be
relevant to judicial determinations, facilitates and upholds
coordination as a paramount value.

168.
Clough, supra note 57, at 730.
169.
The Treaty lists 'lack of jurisdiction, procedural error, error of law, and
misuse of power" as grounds for annulment. Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 753; DAMLAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 436-37 (2006).
But see Bay et al., supra note 109, at 29 (suggesting the possibility that some
Chambers of the CFI "follow a theory of judicial restraint, in line with the
Commission's view that it has a wide margin of discretion in assessing complex
matters of an economic nature, whereas others are willing to subject the Commission's
decisions to a more thorough scrutiny").
172.
Indep. Music Publishers,2006 E.C.R. 11-02289,
532-33.
173.
Id.
534-35; Press Release, The Court of First Instance Annuls the
Decision, supra note 3.
174.
Such was the case in the Sony-BMG merger review process. See generally
Commission Decision 2005/188/EC of 19 July 2004, supra note 2.

20071

2.

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

1569

The U.S. System is not Transparent, Which May Undermine the
Perceived Commitment to Coordination in the U.S.

While the U.S. model does not afford competitors a right to
challenge the FTC's decisions, the potential for judicial disruption of
agency decisicns still lurks in the shadows due to the private right of
action created by Section 16 of the Clayton Act. 175 Any consumers or
competitors meeting the rigorous antitrust-injury requirement can
seek an injunction-and, in fact, are incentivized to do so by the
promise of treble damages. 176 Consequently, a district court might
find itself in the unenviable position of reviewing a merger previously
cleared by the FTC. Such a court would lack any information about
the FTC's compelling justifications for granting merger clearance,
including information about bilateral coordination attempts. Because
of that, private claims challenging mergers in the U.S. also have the
potential of frustrating attempts at coordination between the
European Commission and the FTC.
Moreover, the importance of bilateral coordination both to FTC
policymaking and its adherence to its agreements is nothing more
than a matter of conjecture. On the one hand, the FTC purports to
represent U.S. and European interests (when they do not conflict)
under its current cooperative agreement with the European
Commission. 177 On the other, the FTC is never accountable to that
agreement.' 7 8 The agency alone determines the necessity of action
and the appropriateness of allocating resources to challenge a merger.
Because no judicial review of FTC clearance decisions is allowed by
Heckler, the agency has no incentive to make the reasons for its
decisions public. 179 To lend further legitimacy to U.S. attempts at
transnational coordination, an optimal U.S. policy would acknowledge

175.
15 U.S.C.S. §§ 15, 26 (LexisNexis 2006).
176.
For Section 4 cases, the Supreme Court has stated that an antitrust
plaintiff must prove that an injury resulted from the violation, that the injury was
causally related to the violation, and that the injury was one "of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants'
acts unlawful." Cargill v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986) (quoting
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)); see also
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 537-38 (1983) ("The factors that favor judicial recognition of the Union's antitrust
claim are easily stated. The complaint does allege a causal connection between an
antitrust violation and harm to the Union and further alleges that the defendants
intended to cause that harm.").
177.
1991 Cooperative Agreement, supra note 12, art. VI; see also 1998
Cooperative Agreement, supra note 14, art. VI (incorporating the 1991 Agreement).
178.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (concluding that "an
agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from
judicial review under [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a)(2)").
179.

Id.
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the importance of transparency to international relations, and either
incentivize or require the FTC to disclose any international influences
on its decisionmaking.
i.

The Benefits of Transparency

Numerous scholars and practitioners have suggested that
greater transparency in the administrative system would benefit the
U.S. public.' 8 0 However, there are also a significant number of
international benefits to requiring greater transparency for FTC
From an international relations
merger-clearance decisions.
standpoint, requiring greater transparency on the part of the FTC
when making clearance decisions would reinforce relationships with
other national antitrust authorities; make the FTC more involved in
enforcing its own bilateral agreements; alleviate concerns outside of
the U.S. that coordinating with it means getting strong-armed;
encourage additional bilateral agreements from countries that would
have more confidence in the predictability of U.S. antitrust policy;
and reveal the role that other national antitrust interests play in
Finally, and most importantly,
making clearance decisions.' 8 1
requiring disclosure might provide insight into the similarities and
differences between the U.S. and European systems' substantive
policies, and lay the groundwork for possible harmonization efforts in
the future.
Regulated entities would also benefit from a more transparent
process. Requiring additional disclosure from both the U.S. and E.U.
antitrust authorities would establish regulatory predictability. This
would encourage efficient merger review, provide additional
knowledge of the process to regulated entities, and help those entities
comply with regulations across multiple borders.' 8 2 More disclosure
would inform present and future regulated entities that there may be
considerations other than the Merger Guidelines that are factored
into an FTC or Commission decision to act in one way or anothersuch as those included pursuant to cooperative agreements in closedMr.
door discussions between the FTC and the Commission.
Gonzalez-Diaz, the head of the European Commission's Merger Task

See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, EvaluatingAntitrust Experiments: Using Ex
180.
Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 849 (2001) ("Enforcement officials also could use speeches or
formal statements to explain why they decided not to intervene to challenge or modify
specific transactions.").
Id.
181.
See id. at 851-52 ("Overseas, the development of new competition policy
182.
systems and the enhancement of older regimes, particularly the E.U.'s competition
policy apparatus, means that individual mergers or other forms of commercial activity
are likely to attract attention from a variety of national or regional competition
bodies.").
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Force, has noted that the existing transparency in the European
system provides guidance to industry as to the type of competitionlaw analysis an antitrust authority is likely to carry out. 183 For
regulated entities, this guidance helps alleviate uncertainty and
18 4
makes it cheaper to anticipate potential antitrust concerns.
ii.

The Drawbacks of Transparency

Several arguments against transparency exist, but most-if not
all-fail to outweigh the need for such transparency. First, some
argue that agency resources may be too limited to achieve public
disclosure of the reasons for all clearance decisions. 18 5 This argument
ignores the fact that considerations of cost or resource allocation do
not currently prevent agencies from giving reasons when they so
choose. 186
Second, some argue that the solicitation of public
comments when consent orders are issued obviates the need for
mandatory administrative checks like requiring a statement of
reasons.18 7 However, solicitation of public comments for consent
orders is done selectively, not wholesale, and such comments are
generally limited to discussions of remedies recommended by the
agency.188
The third argument commonly offered against transparency is
that requiring reasons may disincentivize the voluntary disclosure of
confidential information by companies who fear that it will be made
public accidentally. 1 89
The prospect of inadvertent disclosure
disincentivizing voluntary disclosure, however, is not a complete bar
to disclosure. 190 Instead, it is merely a risk to be negotiated on a caseby-case basis, akin to creating public versions of pleadings in civil
191
court cases.
Finally, some argue that prior disclosures from the agency may
bind the agency's hands in future enforcement decisions, or that
requiring disclosure may increase political or interest-group pressure
on staff.19 2 In reality, this risk is minimal if the agency explains the
basis of prior decisions carefully and makes certain to note that

183.
Jeremy Grant & Damien Neven, The Attempted Merger Between General
Electric and Honeywell: A Case Study of TransatlanticConflict 37-38 (Graduate Inst.
of Int'l Studies, Working Paper No. 05/2005, 2005), available at http://hei.unige.ch/
sections/ec/pdfsfWorkingpapers/HEIWP05-2005.pdf.
184.
185.

Id. at 38.
Symposium, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF. L.

REV. 937, 948, 950, 963 (2003).
186.
Id. at 950.
187.
Id. at 963-64.
188.
Id. at 954-61.
189.

Id. at 948, 951.

190.

Id. at 951-53.

191.

Id.

192.

Id. at 948.
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merger investigations are done on a case-by-case, fact-intensive
basis. 193 Thus, it is difficult to see why requiring the FTC to disclose
reasons for its clearance decisions would be anything but a net
benefit to U.S. efforts to coordinate its competition law with the E.U.

IV. MOVING TOWARDS SENSIBLE AND WORKABLE COORDINATION OF
COMPETITION LAW: REEVALUATING NOTIONS OF TRANSPARENCY AND
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

If coordination of competition decisions is to be achieved through
transatlantic efforts-which is certainly the message to be gleaned
from current international agreements and coordination effortstransnational agreements, organic statutes, and judicial review of
merger clearance processes in the E.U. and the U.S. must each be
reevaluated. 194 It is clear that judicial review, a duty to give reasons,
and competitor standing are each necessary in the E.U., both to
achieve the antitrust policy goal of fiercely competitive markets, and
to ameliorate concerns over checks and balances and the ability to
cure mistakes in the process of merger clearance. On the other hand,
the European model is inefficient because it increases transaction
costs and is unfriendly to parties to the transaction. 195 Furthermore,
it is far from clear that industry participants are concerned with
anything other than their own competitive positions when they
challenge Commission decisions.
In such a system, some
consideration of international coordination is necessary to offset the
effects of allowing review after coordination.
Across the Atlantic, the U.S. system condones nondisclosure,
which results in a significant deficit of information about mergerclearance decisions and threatens the perceived legitimacy of
coordination efforts. 196 Moreover, although such challenges are rare,
private antitrust challenges to mergers in the U.S. have the potential
to derail efforts at coordination whenever those mergers cross
national boundaries and are approved by the FTC with the assistance
and cooperation of the Commission.
In effect, it is difficult to take coordination agreements seriously
under either system. To safeguard the significant progress that has
been made towards coordination by European and U.S. antitrust
authorities, judicial decisionmaking must support coordination.

193.
Id. at 950-52.
194.
1998 Cooperative Agreement, supra note 14; 1991 Cooperative Agreement,
supra note 12; Press Release, Commission Decides Not to Oppose, supranote 11.
195.
Hochstadt, supra note 107, at 300-01.
196.
See generally Kovacic, supra note 180, at 847-50 (arguing that enforcement
mechanisms are insufficiently transparent).
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This Note proposes several possible starting points. First, both
the Commission and the FTC are able to and should publicize
information about their work together. 197
Second, the current
cooperative agreements between the U.S. and the E.U. should be
amended to require cooperation whenever there is overlap in merger
review processes. Third, when the CFI presides over claims for
annulment of Commission competition decisions, information about
coordination should be a consideration that would mitigate a decision
to annul. Finally, district courts presiding over private antitrust
challenges to mergers previously cleared by the FTC should also
consider inter-institutional coordination between the FTC and the
Commission as a mitigating factor that would cause it to defer to such
a clearance decision.
A. The Feasibility of MandatingDisclosure and Crafting Standards
of Review
1.

Modifying Disclosure Rules and Standards of Review in the U.S.

The legitimacy and success of transnational coordination efforts
hinges on transparency. A change to the standard of deference in the
context of U.S. and E.U. merger review would require antitrust
authorities on either side to disclose relevant information regarding
transnational cooperation. On the U.S. side, such disclosure can be
mandated legislatively through an amendment to the Administrative
Procedures Act. The FTC may also take voluntary action to create
guidelines for such disclosure that would be least burdensome for the
agency and allow the agency to best safeguard its own prosecutorial
discretion.' 98 Finally, a third option, which Professor Bressman
suggests for judicial review of any agency inaction, may be applied
here: courts may simply compel agencies to provide additional
information about its cooperative efforts when the occasion arises.1 9 9
While the second method of gaining disclosure seems most flexible for
the FTC, the third would also meet the goals of disclosure without
imposing an unnecessary burden on the FTC. On the European side,
the duty to give reasons already obligates the Commission to "disclose
°
in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning [that it] followed. 2 00

197.
On the U.S. side, this would require an amendment to the FTC Act.
However, on the European side, such explanations easily fall into Article 253's duty to
give reasons.
198.
See 5 U.S.C.S. § 553(b)(3)(A) (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining that no formal
rulemaking is required for rules of "agency organization, procedure, or practice").
199.
Bressman, supra note 27, at 1717.
200.
Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Assoc. v. Comm'n, 2006
E.C.R. 11-02289,
176; see Consolidated EC Treaty 2002, supra note 48, art. 253
("[D]ecisions adopted ... by the ...Commission, shall state the reasons on which they
are based ...").
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Requiring the disclosure of transnational coordination efforts already
falls within a permissible reading of Article 253 EC.
Moreover, whenever a court is in a position to second-guess
policy made through coordinative efforts, an acknowledgment of and
deference to FTC-Commission coordination is critical to protect the
progress that has been made by the two institutions. For any case on
the margins, deference is appropriate, and judicial second-guessing
should only take place when there is an egregious misconstruction of
the law.
On the U.S. side, Heckler's non-reviewability doctrine
protects FTC nonenforcement decisions. However, an additional and
minor necessary safeguard to the integrity of FTC coordination efforts
is to require federal courts hearing Section 16 claims to defer to the
FTC's international division whenever relevant. Because the FTC
may always revisit prior decisions and respond to third-party
complaints to ameliorate the harsh effects of any mistakes it may
have made in the past, federal courts may defer without worrying
about forlorn plaintiffs. 20 1 Moreover, because clearance decisions are
"committed to agency discretion by law" under the APA, judicial
review of a prior agency decision that completely ignores prior FTC
20 2
decisions could be construed as contrary to the APA.
2.

Modifying Disclosure Rules and Standards of Review in the E.U.

On the European side, the CFI's mechanical evaluation of
Commission decisions would not change: the duty to give reasons
remains the source of the Court's information. However, information
about coordination would receive deference, which would most
workably take the form of a "factor" in a multi-factor test. Moreover,
the more stringent review of Commission decisions under Airtours,
Schneider, and Tetra Laval has no place in a deferential inquiry into
international coordination because the Court does not have authority
to make policy. 20 3 For the same reason, additional grounds for
annulment advanced by the CFI in recent years (error of fact, error of
appreciation, and absence of reasoning) should not be used to
question coordination efforts. 20 4 No justification exists for allowing
the Court to second-guess CFI judgments regarding coordination in
this context. The Commission is optimally positioned to see that it
meets its obligations under its international agreements with the
FTC.

201.
See, e.g., In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co, N.V., 2004 FTC LEXIS 250 (Dec.
21, 2004).
202.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
203.
The Treaty lists "lack of jurisdiction, procedural error, error of law, and
misuse of power" as grounds for annulment. Clough, supra note 57, at 730.
204.
Id.
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Furthermore, current checks in the European system provide
reassurances that the Commission will continue to prioritize the
goals of the E.U. over those of the U.S. For example, the Commission
is already monitored by committees to prevent Commissioners from
acting in the interests of member state governments. 20 5 Certainly,
such committees may also serve as watchdogs to ensure that, in those
circumstances in which U.S. interests differ from those of Europe,
U.S. interests do not undermine European competition policy.
Moreover, increased transparency by the FTC would likely assuage
such concerns, because the extent of the give-and-take between the
U.S. and E.U. antitrust authorities would become more obvious to all.
3.

Memorializing the Commitment to Coordination and Confronting
Problems of Harmonization

Another necessary component of the legitimization of mergerreview coordination through transparency is to memorialize through
"hard" transnational agreement what, according to at least one FTC
20 6
official, the FTC and the Commission already routinely accomplish.
The goals of the 1991 Cooperative Agreement, which are largely
furthered by the subsequent 1998 Cooperation Agreement, lack
coverage with respect to mergers, primarily due to perceived "mergertimetable" difficulties. Although the 1998 Agreement between the
U.S. and the E.U. does not currently govern merger review due to
these difficulties, the Sony-BMG investigation demonstrates that
time constraints do not hamper FTC and Commission coordination
when the two parties choose to expedite that process and
coordinate. 20 7 Amending the 1998 Agreement to set out additional
concrete terms for coordination in the realm of merger review and
clearance would further legitimize the process already in place for
merger review.
The final question left unanswered by these starting points is:
what should a court do when it believes that efforts at coordination
have superseded the laws that the court seeks to apply? Because
harmonization is outside of the scope of this Note, this solution
maintains that there are times when antitrust authorities in the U.S.
and E.U. will have divergent positions on the same matter-but that
this reality should not stop authorities on either side of the Atlantic
from striving towards cooperation for the myriad of other instances in
which it is feasible. These suggested steps do not propose a covert
way of allowing European substantive law to supplant that of the
U.S. (or vice versa) through a doctrine of deference. Instead, it

205.
206.
cooperation
207.

Bermann, supra note 158, at 938.
See Parisi, supra note 110, at 515-16 (discussing
agreement between the U.S. and the EC).
1998 Cooperative Agreement, supra note 14.

the enforcement
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proposes deference to a procedure of coordination-to which the U.S.
and the E.U. have already become committed through agreement and
practice.

V. CONCLUSION

After the FTC and the Commission granted clearance to the
Sony-BMG joint venture, but prior to the CFI's decision in the case,
an official at the FTC's International Division noted that, in his view,
the day-to-day cooperation and coordination between the FTC and the
Commission had been "exemplified... by the concurrent FTC and EC
reviews of the Sony/BMG... merger[]. ' 20 8 Indeed, despite what may
appear to be fundamental substantive differences in the antitrust law
of the U.S. and the E.U., the FTC and the Commission reached a
consensus. Ironically, soon after the FTC official's statement, the
CFI's decision sent the Commission back to the proverbial drawing
board. The CFI's scrutiny of the Commission's Sony-BMG decision
makes dialogue on the standards for and possible flaws of judicial
review in the U.S. and the E.U. appropriate and timely.
In both the U.S. and the E.U., mergers have the potential to
bring about numerous social benefits, such as synergies for
businesses, lower prices for consumers, and greater resources for
research and development (which in turn promotes innovation).
Absent transatlantic cooperation, transaction costs for merging may
be higher for corporations operating on a global scale. Sony and
Bertelsmann endured almost four years of uncertainty pending a
final decision from the Commission just one month ago. 20 9 Without
coordination, in the future, firms may find themselves jumping
through numerous overlapping regulatory hoops and facing
inconsistent requests and concerns over their attempts to reorganize.
Furthermore, without coordination, antitrust authorities-with less
information and fewer resources than they would have had if they
had coordinated with other authorities-may find themselves
reinventing the wheel with each merger clearance review.
Consequently, as this Note observes, the need for transnational
cooperation in the antitrust arena is elementary to all-including
regulatory beneficiaries, policy-making bodies that have encouraged
transatlantic agreements through delegation, and the antitrust
authorities that have entered into such cooperative agreements. The
one branch of government in both the U.S. and the E.U. that is left
Yet cooperation will
out of this formulation is the judiciary.
to such
approaches
comprehensive
whenever
fail
inevitably

208.
209.

Parisi, supra note 110, at 522.
Press Release, Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval, supra note 25.

2007]

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

1577

Any attempts to reach consistent
cooperation are lacking.
transatlantic statements on antitrust policy must take into account
the judiciary's role in shaping U.S. and E.U. antitrust policy.
The necessary steps towards a workable solution begin with the
acknowledgment that international coordination of merger review is
intrinsically valuable and should be treated as more than an
afterthought in the judicial scheme. As the world becomes smaller,
the need for global antitrust policy only becomes more obvious. This
Note suggests two small steps towards such a goal. First, more
Increased
information should be available to the judiciary.
transparency on both sides of the Atlantic would give additional teeth
to the idea of coordination and send a signal of international support.
Second, standards of review for clearance decisions must consider and
defer to coordination whenever issues of substantive law do not stand
in the way of such a determination. To the extent that: (1) the CFI's
annulment of the Commission's decision in Sony-BMG marks a trend
in the E.U. or (2) mergers previously cleared by the FTC will be
challenged in the future by consumers, judicial recognition of the
value of transnational coordination will prevent the frustration of
that coordination.
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